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Introduction 
The events in Iraq do create opportunities to examine democracy, power, 
tyranny, military force, cultural differences, law, civil liberties, Islam, 
Christianity, economic development, and even human nature. We ought to 
understand these issues, because they arise in our own lives and communities; 
because they are intrinsically interesting and morally serious. (Levine 2004: 
22) 
Democracy in Iraq 
On 7 March 2010, the sun rose over the city of Baghdad much as it had since the dawn of 
human civilization. As the call to prayer rang out across the city, the seven humble families of 
one particular apartment block in Karkh1 (Western Baghdad) went about their usual morning 
rituals: the devout among them prayed, the children stirred and played games, the women 
prepared breakfast for their families, and the men completed the first of their morning chores. 
However, today was no ordinary day. Today was the day of Iraq’s latest round of national 
elections. Today held the promise of moving Iraq beyond the violence and trauma of the US-led 
occupation, beyond the 35 years of Baathist oppression, and beyond the succession of largely 
ineffective governments that had ruled over Iraq since its creation by the British in the 1920s. 
For these seven families – and indeed for all Iraqis – today represented an opportunity to ponder 
these hardships and to elect a government that might represent the needs and interests of the 
heterogeneous Iraqi population and deliver them a more stable, secure and democratic future. 
The residents of the small apartment block in Karkh were thus more reflective than usual. 
Sadly, this mood of quiet contemplation was soon shattered. At around 7am a deadly 
explosion tore through the building. In an instant the place these families called home had 
transformed into a pile of rubble, pinning them under the weight of the twisted debris. 
Neighbours and friends rushed to the scene and were soon joined by rescue teams and 
ambulances, all searching for survivors. Tragically, four innocent Iraqi civilians were killed in 
                                                 
1 The story of this household in Western Baghdad is taken from an article written by Qassim Al-Hilfi and published 
in the Iraqi newspaper Al-Sabah (The Morning) (Al-Hilfi, 2010).  
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the explosion and seven others were badly wounded. Seeing the bodies of their friends and 
family lying prostrate and bleeding on the street, the women embraced the limp and lifeless 
bodies, tears streaming down their faces as they wailed with grief. The men, overwhelmed with 
sorrow, beat their heads with their hands and fell to the ground. The people in the crowd shifted 
awkwardly on their feet, unsure of where to look or how to help as another tragedy unfolded in 
Iraq. Gradually, the survivors pulled themselves together and said their goodbyes to the dead, 
making the appropriate arrangements for the bodies to be sent to the local mortuary. 
Remarkably, these seven grief stricken families were still determined to vote. They began 
searching through the rubble in the hope of finding their official documents so that they could 
proceed as planned to the nearest polling station. Once they had the documents, they set out 
together on foot, walking for miles before lining up and then placing their ballot paper in the 
plastic tubs provided. Among them were Abu Nour and his wife Um Nour who had lost two of 
their children in the blast. Reflecting the bravery of the Iraqi people, as well as their 
determination to create a more democratic future, through her tears Um told reporters that she 
knew there were ‘still terrorists supplied by actors who are against the success of democracy in 
Iraq. We pay with our blood and our children to sacrifice for our nation which is our salvation 
and our home’ (Um Nour cited in Al-Hilfi 2010). Despite his pain, her husband agreed: 
This process must have sacrifices … I was chosen by God to be one of those 
who sacrifice pure blood to enable the right way and state-building which are 
sought by all good people in this country and the sacrifices are required … 
But our response [to the terrorists] was greater because we bid farewell to our 
martyrs and then we went to the polls to say ‘yes to Iraq and no to all its 
enemies’. (Abu Nour cited in Al-Hilfi 2010) 
In total, around 11.5 million Iraqis joined with Abu and Um in saying ‘yes to Iraq and no to all 
its enemies’ by taking part in the 2010 elections. Although the security clamp-down had left the 
streets of the nation eerily quiet in the lead up to the vote, this soon changed as scores of Iraqi 
citizens – men and women, young and old, Sunni and Shia, Kurd and Arab, Christian and 
Muslim – filled the streets with their chatter and excitement. Some had arrived early and now 
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paraded their purple ink-stained index fingers to the growing crowds; others arrived later, 
preferring to wait in the long queues as a sign of their solidarity and to discuss politics, religion 
and football with their friends and fellow citizens. Like Abu and Um Nour, each had their own 
tragic story to tell of war, loss and oppression, and each was acting in defiance of the violence 
and chaos of post-Saddam Iraq, ignoring the blood-curdling threats issued by various insurgents 
and terrorist networks. 
 However, these were not the first successful elections to have been held in Iraq since the 
US-led invasion and occupation began in 2003. Just over 12 months earlier in January 2009, 
Iraq witnessed relatively free and fair elections for 14 of Iraq’s 18 provincial councils.2 These 
elections were preceded by a series of democratic elections and a referendum that were held 
throughout the nation in 2005. These included the January elections which saw some 8.5 million 
Iraqis vote to nominate a national assembly which went on to draw up the Iraqi constitution. A 
draft of the constitution was then circulated to the citizens of Iraq via the nation’s diverse media 
sector before they gave their verdict in a nationwide referendum in October. This time their 
ballot paper posed a simple question printed in both Arabic and Kurdish: ‘Do you support the 
draft constitution?’. Approximately ten million Iraqis answered this question and, despite some 
opposition, the overwhelming majority replied in the affirmative. With the constitution 
officially accepted, the Iraqi people went to the polls for the third time in December 2005 when 
11 million Iraqis elected their own government. 
The series of democratic elections that have occurred throughout Iraq since 2005 have 
attracted the attention of scholars, foreign policy pundits and journalists from across the 
political and ideological spectrum. While such coverage is critiqued and problematized 
throughout this book, it is worth noting here that, for the most part, coverage of Iraq since 2003 
has emphasized horrific violence through depictions of suicide bombings, kidnappings, mortar 
attacks, improvised explosive devices, sectarian hostility and the threat of all-out civil war. One 
                                                 
2 The remaining four Kurdish provinces held separate local elections in July of 2009. 
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might argue that the tendency of the ‘Western’3 media, academics and other commentators to 
focus on the daily atrocities of post-Saddam Iraq has largely obfuscated the positive political 
developments and seen successful stories of Iraq’s fledgling democracy buried beneath a 
seemingly endless reel of bloodshed and chaos. Where attention has been paid to the political 
landscape in Iraq it has tended to privilege disagreements and disunities among Iraq’s myriad 
ethno-religious factions over the complexity of Iraqi politics and the highly inclusive and 
progressive nature of the democratic deliberations being conducted. 
Much of the coverage has also argued that Iraq simply lacks the social and political 
prerequisites necessary to build towards democratic forms of governance. For example, only 
months after the relatively free and fair elections of 2005, USA Today published an editorial by 
former US army officer, Ralph Peters, in which he discussed his concerns about Iraq and 
expressed his opinion as to why democracy would not take root there. It is worth citing at 
length: 
Iraq is failing. No honest observer can conclude otherwise. Even six months 
ago, there was hope. Now the chances for a democratic, unified Iraq are 
dwindling fast … Iraq still exists on the maps, but in reality it’s gone. Only a 
military coup – which might come in the next few years – could hold the 
artificial country together … Yet, for all our errors, we did give the Iraqis a 
unique chance to build a rule-of-law democracy. They preferred to indulge in 
old hatreds, confessional violence, ethnic bigotry and a culture of corruption. 
It appears that the cynics were right: Arab societies can’t support democracy 
as we know it. And people get the government they deserve. For us, Iraq’s 
impending failure is an embarrassment. For the Iraqis – and other Arabs – it’s 
a disaster the dimensions of which they do not yet comprehend. Iraq was the 
Arab world’s last chance to board the train to modernity, to give the region a 
future, not just a bitter past. The violence staining Baghdad’s streets with gore 
                                                 
3 The use of the terms ‘West’ and ‘East’ throughout this project is in itself problematic given that it relies on a 
Eurocentric vision of the world. Unlike the terms ‘North’ and ‘South’ which have a clearly defined geographical 
boundary in the equator, the terms ‘East’ and ‘West’ are ideological, originating in Europe to divide the Eurasian 
landmass between the European or ‘Western’ world and the Asiatic or ‘Eastern’ world. Despite their Eurocentric 
origin and their geographical inaccuracy, these terms remain in common parlance and will be used throughout this 
book.  
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isn’t only a symptom of the Iraqi government’s incompetence, but of the 
comprehensive inability of the Arab world to progress in any sphere of 
organized human endeavour. We are witnessing the collapse of a civilization. 
(Peters 2006) 
On the one hand, balanced assessments of the deep-seated and intractable problems that Iraqi 
democracy faces along with an open acknowledgement of the failures of the US occupation and 
the Iraqi government are welcome. On the other, it is instructive to note how often assessments 
like Peters’s seek to connect such concerns to a series of widely held assumptions about Iraq’s 
political history (or, more broadly, that of Arabs or Muslims). For Peters and those of his ilk, 
whatever problems Iraqi democracy faces, they are not the fault of the invading and occupying 
forces of the West, nor of the political system they tried to install, but indicative of the 
backward and barbaric nature of the Iraqi people. Not only is Iraq ‘failing’ but, even when 
offered a way out in the form of democracy and freedom, Iraqis prefer ‘to indulge in old 
hatreds, confessional violence, ethnic bigotry and a culture of corruption’. Arab society as a 
whole has not only missed the ‘train to modernity’ and failed to ‘progress in any sphere of 
organized human endeavour’, it is also incapable of supporting ‘democracy as we know it’. 
Arabs are locked inside an anti-democratic cage built by their own ‘culture’, their ‘bitter past’, 
and their ‘civilization’. 
The central argument of this book is that not only are such notions remarkably common 
in discussions of the entire effort to bring democracy to Iraq, but also that they are – sometimes 
unwittingly, sometimes deliberately – couched in a series of very old ideas about the supposed 
political divide between East and West. This divide relies on a distinct dualism: the West is seen 
as having a unique inclination towards democracy, it tolerates diversity and opposing points of 
view, it encourages innovation and excellence, and it supports freedom, equality and the rule of 
law. Paradoxically, the East purportedly is driven by impulses that give way to vice and 
violence, that rely on stagnant traditions and out-dated modes of culture, that limit freedom and 
expression, and that give rise to unimaginably cruel tyrants who rule by fear, oppression and 
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bloodshed. These are, of course, overly simplistic ways of looking at both the political history 
of the Occident and the Orient. Not only do they reduce rich and complex histories to a 
storybook narrative, but they routinely ignore the myriad places and times in which the West 
itself has acted oppressively and tyrannically, while the East has practised tolerance, 
cooperation and the rule of law. Repeated and recycled with little critique, this simple dualism 
has amounted to an intellectual orthodoxy that helps explain away complex realities: the West 
has a duty to spread democracy among the uncivilized ‘lesser breeds’ but the project is futile 
because the East is trapped in an unescapable web of barbarism and bellicosity. 
The aim of this book is to demonstrate the myriad ways in which – despite all its obvious 
flaws and inherent racisms – this dichotomy has been brought to bear on discussions of the 
complex political history of Iraq. It then seeks to expose the manufactured and arbitrary nature 
of this false dichotomy by examining Iraq’s long and complex history of struggling towards 
egalitarianism, collective governance and democratic reform. From ancient Mesopotamian 
assemblies, through Islamic philosophy and doctrine and, despite foreign interference and 
autocratic tyrants, Iraq has a democratic history of its own. This alternative history of Iraq 
forces us to acknowledge that democracy is not ‘ours’ to give to the Iraqis; it is a dynamic 
system of governance underpinned by virtues of justice, equality and liberty. Virtues that the 
people of Iraq (or Arabs or Muslims) have at least as much historical claim to as anyone in the 
West. 
Critical Theory, Orientalism and the Democratic History of Iraq 
In order to challenge this intellectual orthodoxy and to unearth the democratic history of Iraq, 
however, this study must first come to terms with a body of scholarship referred to here as 
critical theory. For Max Horkheimer, such critical theories set out to challenge ‘The world that 
is given to the individual and which he must accept and take into account’ and is therefore 
‘wholly distrustful of the rules of conduct with which society as presently constituted provides 
each of its members’ (Horkheimer 2007 [1937]: 350, 352). In other words, critical theory can be 
seen to involve the questioning of ideologies – that nexus of received wisdoms, beliefs, values 
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and attitudes inherited from the world around us. In critical theory, these ideologies are 
scrutinized in order to highlight the assumptions that underpin their claims to truth, their 
processes of inclusion and exclusion, their relation to other ideological positions and 
assumptions, and the problematic nature of their universal application. 
Arguably, the most influential example of this kind of ideological critique is Karl Marx’s4 
body of work relating to the rise of capitalism. Here, Marx proposed a radical new approach to 
history, focusing on the ways in which the ruling elite sought to justify and maintain the 
imbalances that came with capitalism by making capitalism itself appear as a legitimate mode of 
production (Marx 1977 [1887]-a, 1977 [1887]-b). As Marx and his long-time collaborator, 
Freidrich Engels, articulated elsewhere, the ruling elite were successful in doing this because, 
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: that is, the 
class which is the ruling material force in society is at the same time its ruling 
intellectual force … In so far, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine 
the whole extent of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in their whole 
range and thus, among other things, rule also as thinkers, as producers of 
ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: 
thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. (Marx and Engels 1974 
[1846]: 64) 
By propagating these ‘ruling ideas’ the elite are also able to establish a certain degree of consent 
from the masses. In other words, as Antonio Gramsci put it, cultural hegemony is achieved 
when otherwise ordinary ideas are repeated and recycled to such an extent that they become 
what everybody knows, but few dare to question (Gramsci 1971 [1929–1935], 1978 [1921–
1926]). 
Perhaps the best application of this critical-theoretical approach to political history and 
political discourse is found in the work of Michel Foucault. Throughout his work, Foucault 
developed a model of history which ‘breaks off the past from the present and, by demonstrating 
                                                 
4 It is worth noting here many of the scholars discussed here like Marx, Gramsci and Foucault also relied heavily on 
Orientalist stereotypes throughout their work. This problematic legacy in the Western humanities and social sciences 
– and especially its consequences for thinking about the history of democracy - is examined in detail in Chapter 1. 
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the foreignness of the past, relativizes and undercuts the legitimacy of the present’ (Poster 1984: 
74). To do this, Foucault attempted to move the debate over issues of power away from the 
hegemonic proliferation of dominant ideologies (or ‘ruling ideas’), towards a more complex 
understanding of the constituent layers of power (or ‘discourses’) which criss-crossed the social 
world. Foucault was able to demonstrate that these various discourses converge to provide a 
given society a particular view of the world (or ‘episteme’) which can unwittingly be 
underpinned by discontinuities and distortions that are embedded within the discourses 
themselves (Foucault 1970). Despite its potential to be grievously flawed, each successive 
episteme both drives and unifies intellectual production and thereby constitutes itself as the 
legitimate and righteous view of the world (Foucault 1981, 1991 [1979], 2005 [1969]). In this 
way, overly simplistic and often erroneous ideas – such as the suggested incompatibility of 
democracy with Iraqi / Arab culture or the Islamic religion – are fed into the complex matrix of 
political, social and cultural discourses that surround us. They are taught in the classroom, they 
form the plotlines of comic books, novels and cinema blockbusters, they are repeated by 
journalists in the nightly news, and are used by politicians and pundits to justify imperial 
expansion and epic wars. 
Another seminal theorist, Jacques Derrida urged us to ‘deconstruct’ such discourses by 
paying close attention to the binary oppositions that underpin ideology (Derrida 1973 [1967], 
1976 [1967], 2003 [1967]). For Derrida, these binary oppositions help to make sense of the 
world by reducing complex phenomenon to an austere and overly simplistic set of polar 
opposites that are generally thought to be at odds with each other such as ‘good v. evil’ or 
‘Occident and Orient’. The process of deconstruction is first to expose these binary oppositions, 
to establish their inherent contradictions, marginalities and structured silences and then to 
challenge the lineage of discourses on which they are premised. This project seeks to expose the 
assumptions that underpin the binary opposition between the West’s alleged tendency to 
democracy and the East’s proclivity for violence. By deconstructing the binary oppositions 
inherent in such assumptions it becomes possible to demonstrate that, not only do they privilege 
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generalizations over nuance and depth, but also that they are based on suppositions and false 
dualisms about the politics of both the East and the West. 
Arguably the most erudite example of this critical-theoretical approach to the binary 
between East and West is the work of Edward W. Said (Said 1979, 1981, 1994 [1993]). In his 
seminal Orientalism,5 Said deconstructed an astounding number of academic, bureaucratic and 
literary texts from the Colonial period. What he found was that the Colonial period had seen the 
West (or more specifically the European Colonial powers) approach the East (and here Said 
focuses on the Arab world) with a sense of superiority – intellectually, politically, culturally and 
militarily. This sense of superiority not only permeated an entire episteme of interdependent 
discourses, institutions and practices in Europe, but also served to create an ideological fantasy 
that bore no relation to the reality and complexity of Middle Eastern society – its myriad of 
cultures, religions, peoples, customs, and histories. 
This Orientalist fantasy served to homogenize, demonize and stereotype the Middle East 
according to fairly reductive and negative terms, such that the Oriental was viewed as the 
‘other’. During the nineteenth century this creation of the ‘other’ transformed from loose 
assumptions and general ‘ideas about the Orient – its sensuality, its tendency to despotism, its 
aberrant mentality, its habits of inaccuracy, its backwardness – into a separate and unchallenged 
coherence’ (Said 2003 [1978]: 205). Clearly the unquestioned tendency to view the people of 
the Orient as deficient and inferior ‘others’ served the Colonial agenda and its practice of 
continuing to dominate and control sections of the East. The ideological fantasy of Orientalism 
had the effect of marginalizing or, more accurately, silencing, the histories and cultures of these 
‘others’. Said concluded that the people of the Orient have been ‘rarely seen or looked at; they 
were seen through, analyzed not as citizens, or even people, but as problems to be solved or 
                                                 
5 It should be noted here that while Said’s Orientalism is widely recognized as an unprecedented breakthrough in 
understanding and critiquing Western conceptions of the non-European world, it was somewhat pre-empted (and 
paralleled) by the work of several scholars (Abdel-Malek 1963, Alatas 1977, T. Asad 1973a, 1973b, Grossrichard 
1998 [1979], Jameelah 1971, Tibawi 1964, Turner, 1978). 
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confined or – as the Colonial powers openly coveted their territory – taken over’ (Said 2003 
[1978]: 207). 
Central to Orientalism was therefore a binary opposition between an assumed Western 
superiority and Eastern backwardness. As is argued in Chapter 1, this dualism is indicative of a 
particular sub-set of the Orientalist fantasy on which studies of the political history of both the 
Orient and Occident have so often relied; that of Western democracy and Oriental despotism. 
These discourses of democracy have a parallel history that can be traced back through the 
Western scholarly canon. From the time of the ancient Greeks, through the Crusades, the 
Reformation and the founding of modern representative democracy, most scholars have 
contributed to our belief of the West as unique in its propensity for democratic governance and 
the East as simply incapable of such an advanced political system. Continuing through the 
eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries such discourses achieved the status of a received 
wisdom, they proliferated an ideological uniformity that was rarely critiqued or negated, and 
they helped bolster the more ambitious claims of so-called experts on the Orient. However, to 
argue that this dialectic belongs to the annals of history severely underestimates the impact that 
this discursive lineage continues to have on scholarship, foreign policy and journalism that 
concerns itself with the Middle East. As Peters’ opinion editorial demonstrates, the notion that 
the Middle East and its ‘culture’, ‘bitter past’, and ‘civilization’ is somehow antithetical to 
democracy remains a central tenet of discussions of the region today. 
Said’s work not only encourages us to deconstruct the binaries that exist between 
‘Western democrats’ and ‘Oriental despots’, however, but to move beyond these by asserting 
counter-histories free from prejudices and simplistic dualisms. As Franz Fanon reminds us, 
‘Colonialism is not satisfied with merely holding a people in its grip and emptying the native’s 
brain of all form and content. By a kind of perverted logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed 
people, and distorts, disfigures, and destroys it’ (Fanon 2005 [1963]: 210). The task therefore of 
many Post-Colonial scholars has been to retrieve the silenced histories that lay behind the roar 
of Western power, ‘both in terms of the objective history of subaltern or dominated, 
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marginalized groups, “counter-histories”, and in terms of the subjective experience of the effects 
of Colonialism and domination’ (Young 1995: 58). 
In this vein, the study being conducted here also holds up to scrutiny the notion that the 
West has a particular penchant for democracy and is therefore more civilized than the non-
European world. This is a central premise of the work of Post-Colonial scholar Homi K. Bhabha 
who noted that the guiding discourses of the modern Western world – justice, democracy, 
liberty – were created at exactly the same moment that the West was involved in the tyranny of 
the Colonial project (Bhabha 1994, 1995 [1990]). Bhabha elaborates on this point in an 
interview with Jonathan Rutherford, where he states that: 
I think we need to draw attention to the fact that the advent of Western 
modernity, located as it generally is in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
was the moment when certain master narratives of the state, the citizen, 
cultural value, art, science, the novel, when these major cultural discourses 
and identities came to define the ‘Enlightenment’ of Western society and the 
critical rationality of Western personhood. The time at which these things 
were happening was the same time at which the West was producing another 
history of itself through its Colonial possessions and relations. That 
ideological tension, visible in the history of the West as a despotic power, at 
the very moment of the birth of democracy and modernity, has not been 
adequately written in a contradictory and contrapuntal discourse of tradition. 
Unable to resolve the contradictions perhaps, the history of the West as a 
despotic power, a Colonial power, has not been adequately written side by 
side with its claims to democracy and solidarity. (Bhabha 1990: 218) 
Bhabha’s assertion is of particular importance in the context of this work because he exposes a 
more sophisticated history of the modern Western world from the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries onwards. On the one hand, this era of Western history witnessed a series of social 
upheavals and political struggles in Britain, Western Europe and in North America which paved 
the way for modern, representative forms of democracy. On the other hand, as Bhabha observes 
above, at precisely the same time that the West was confronting its own political instability and 
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forging states based on egalitarian models of social justice and representative democracy, it was 
spreading out across much of the globe in the quest for resources and power. In other words, 
while the Western world fought for a government that acknowledged and responded to the 
needs of the citizen at home, it was simultaneously involved in subjugating, capturing, 
enslaving and, in many cases, exterminating, the people of the non-Western world. 
This points to the need for a more complex view of the political history of the West, and 
the arguably more urgent need for a sophisticated understanding of the political history of the 
Orient. Behind the constituent layers of Orientalism as conceived by Said and the fantasies it 
propagated and projected onto the region is a complicated heritage. As in the West, there are 
long periods in which violence and despotism triumphed and, in other times and places, epochs 
in which ordinary people came together to practise forms of government akin to what is today 
called democracy. Unfortunately, the notion that democracy could have been practised in non-
Western contexts has been overwhelmingly ignored in traditional accounts of the history of 
democracy. Instead ‘the standard history of democracy’ privileges the keystone moments of 
Western civilization: the achievements of the ancient Greeks and Romans, the later 
development of the British parliament, the American Declaration of Independence and the 
French Revolution, and the gradual global spread of democracy since the end of the Cold War. 
However, as recent research has begun to demonstrate ‘there is much more to the history of 
democracy than this foreshortened genealogy admits. There is a whole “secret” history, too big, 
complex and insufficiently Western in character to be included in the standard narrative’ 
(Isakhan and Stockwell 2011: 1) 
Drawing on this research and employing a critical-theoretical approach, this book focuses 
specifically on the political history of Iraq in order to demonstrate the nation’s rich democratic 
heritage. To do so, it is necessary to briefly outline what is meant by the term ‘democracy’ in 
this context. While there is not space enough here to document the varied debates and 
definitions of democracy that have been asserted over time, suffice it to say that democracy 
itself is a complex and contested concept with little consensus on its precise character or on an 
 13
exact definition (Isakhan 2012b). There are ancient Grecian attempts to understand democracy, 
mostly by those who were not in favour of it (Aristotle 1943 [350 BCE], Plato 1975 [380 BCE]) 
and there are accounts by those who witnessed the dramatic sequence of events that led to the 
emergence of modern representative democracy in Europe and America (de Tocqueville 1864 
[1835], Paine 1856 [1791]). More recent times have brought us minimalist empirical definitions 
(Schumpeter 2011 [1947]) and an emphasis on certain preconditions, such as economic 
prosperity (Downs 1957, Lipset 1971 [1959]), autonomous social classes (Dahl 1971, Lijphart 
1977), a certain civic culture (Almond and Verba 1989 [1963]), strong political institutions 
(Dahl 1971, Huntington 1968) and the presence of a political elite who must be determined to 
see democracy grow and spread (Dahl 2005 [1961]). Paralleling this literature are various 
philosophical models detailing what a more democratic world might look like, including calls 
for wider participation (Pateman 1999 [1970]), a radical strategy to undermine the hegemony of 
the Western liberal model (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) and the need for greater degrees of 
rational-critical debate (Habermas 1996 [1992]) and deliberation (Dryzek 2000). 
From this corpus it is possible to offer a definition of democracy that is both succinct 
enough to eschew the myriad differences between the empirical and normative peculiarities of 
the literature, and at the same time practicable enough to be applied to the political past. Such a 
definition of democracy would necessarily consist of three fundamental parts. First, any claim to 
democracy must be constituted by a group of more or less equal individuals (the citizen body) 
who have similar access to certain rights (such as freedom of speech) that come with parallel 
responsibilities (such as respect for other opinions). This citizen body should also be vested with 
some power to determine key decisions facing their community (such as how and by whom they 
are governed). Second, this citizen body should be governed by a set of laws or norms that serve 
to both protect their rights and responsibilities and to hold those in power to account. Finally, 
for democracy to work the citizen body must be prepared to do three things equally: they must 
contest (offer contrary points of view, join an opposition party); they must co-operate (accept 
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the result of an election, form a civil society organization); and they must participate (attend 
assemblies, vote and get involved in politics). 
This study will therefore assess the successes and failures in Iraq’s own history of 
democracy by applying the above criteria across five key epochs in Iraqi history. In Chapter 2, 
these criteria are applied to the pre-Athenian democratic developments that occurred throughout 
the ancient Middle East from approximately 3000 BCE to the modern age. Despite the common 
misconception that the ancient Middle East was home to a lineage of megalomaniacal kings and 
their savage empires, there is evidence that the practices of democracy were found throughout 
the region from the smallest city-states to the largest kingdoms. Chapter 3 analyzes the 
participatory forms of government and egalitarian social movements found throughout both the 
history and doctrine of Islam. From the life of the Prophet through to the Ottoman era, the 
history of various Islamic empires and the teachings of a range of clerics and philosophers 
reveal a picture very much at odds with the overwhelming consensus in the West that the 
religion of Islam is antithetical to democracy and works against inclusion, diversity and debate. 
Together, these two chapters raise important questions about the discourses of democracy: they 
not only illustrate that democracy was at work in the Orient long before the rise of Athens and 
the birth of Western civilization, but also that it was kept alive by the Islamic world as much of 
Europe declined into the inequity of much of the medieval period. 
In Chapters 4–6, the focus shifts slightly. It builds atop the above analysis to also examine 
the extent to which Iraq developed a ‘public sphere’. For Jurgen Habermas the public sphere is 
defined as ‘that [which] connects society with the state and thus has a function in the political 
realm’ (Habermas 1996 [1989]: 28). In other words, the public sphere is constituted by those 
institutions and practices that engender a culture of open and ‘rational-critical’ debate towards 
‘democratic deliberation’ (Habermas 1987 [1981], 1996 [1992]). These are added here because 
the public sphere is usually associated with institutions and practices that were not known in 
ancient Mesopotamia or the classical Islamic world. These include the extent to which rational-
critical debate is supported by a robust media sector, the political landscape is constituted by 
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oppositional parties, and an engaged civil society is made up of various actors who co-ordinate 
activities such as mass protests which agitate for civil rights, air grievances or work towards a 
more inclusive political order. 
In Chapter 4 these criteria are discussed in relation to Colonial Iraq (1921–58) and the 
role that Iraq’s complex media and political landscape played in fostering an engaged public 
sphere as the country navigated the thorny issues of nationhood and occupation under the 
auspices of British Colonialism and the installed Hashemite monarchy. Chapter 5 follows with a 
re-examination of Post-Colonial Iraq (1958–2003), an era which not only witnessed the 
ascension of a number of repressive regimes but also a number of clandestine Iraqi opposition 
groups from across various ethno-religious and political divides who began producing their own 
media outlets and calling for democratic change. Finally, Chapter 6 focuses on Re-Colonial Iraq 
(2003–11) following the invasion and occupation of Iraq by the ‘Coalition of the Willing’. This 
era has seen an unprecedented upsurge in oppositional political parties, critical media outlets 
and virulent protest movements – from religious clergymen to secular civil society actors – who 
have worked together to call for an end to foreign occupation, to rally against corruption and to 
demand more democracy. Far from a benighted Iraq prone to Oriental despotism these three 
chapters reveal an alternative vision of modern Iraqi history in which one finds a sophisticated 
political culture, deeply concerned with the issue of democratic governance. 
Taken together these chapters demonstrate that Iraq has a very different history to the one 
with which it is usually associated. Care must be taken not to over-emphasize the depth and 
breadth of these democratic moments in Iraq; participatory assemblies, egalitarian beliefs and a 
lively public sphere cannot be taken in lieu of a robust democracy. As with all Western 
democracies, which have had their own problems and inconsistencies – from ancient Greek 
slavery to modern US apathy – Iraqi democracy often falls short of the democratic ideal. 
Nonetheless, this alternative account of Iraq’s political history does provide a more complex 
lens through which to view Iraq’s past and present. It illuminates a democratic potential greatly 
 16
at odds with the lineage of Orientalist tropes and motifs that have been used to categorize and 
understand Iraq in the West. 
However, this is not the first attempt to unearth a more nuanced and detailed assessment 
of Iraq’s political history. Several studies have revealed that Colonial Iraq was home to a varied 
media landscape, a thriving religious and secular intellectual scene, myriad political parties and 
movements, and prolific literary and artistic discourses (Bashkin 2009, 2010, Dawisha 2005a, 
Wien 2006). Others have provided unique insights into Post-Colonial Iraq and noted that while 
a succession of autocratic leaders sought to control and manipulate the political discourse of 
Iraq in order to situate the Iraqi people into a position of forced acquiescence, they 
simultaneously gave rise to a virulent culture of resistance and opposition (Baram 1991, Batatu 
1982 [1978], Bengio 1998). Taking more of a longitudinal approach, there are several excellent 
studies of Iraq’s political history from the British Mandate through to the fall of Saddam (Marr 
2004 [1985], Stansfield 2007, Tripp 2007 [2000]). These include those which have offered a 
more detailed examination of the cultural formations and intellectual life of Iraq with particular 
emphasis on the literary, intellectual and political cultures which have openly called for Iraq’s 
liberation and discussed the possibilities for a cohesive and democratic future (Al-Musawi 2006, 
Davis 2005b, Dawisha 2009). 
Despite the strength and importance of this body of work and its assertion of a more 
complex assessment of Iraq’s political culture and history, none of these studies provide a 
sustained critical analysis of the discourses which have been brought to bear on Iraq’s recent 
democratization. In addition, none of these works have attempted to problematize and unhinge 
these discourses by juxtaposing them against a thorough analysis of the indigenous roots of 
democracy in Iraq. Another problem with the aforementioned studies is their narrow historical 
focus and the virtual absence of important epochs such as ancient Mesopotamia and the Islamic 
period, not to mention the successes and failures of democracy in Iraq since 2003. Finally, none 
of these studies provide a discussion of the ways in which Iraq’s democratic legacy might be 
used as a tool in re-thinking the history of democracy and in building, stabilizing and 
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legitimizing democracy across Iraq today. This project therefore attempts to fill this lacuna by 
couching modern Iraqi experiences with democracy in a broader discussion of its rich political 
history. 
In conducting a project such as this there are several key problems and limitations. First 
among these is the fact that it is difficult to analyze and discuss with any sense of finality Iraq’s 
democracy. At the time of writing, daily reports from across Iraq continue to document the 
chaos and turmoil of the nation, including the grim and complex battles fought between the 
occupying forces, the Iraqi security services, various insurgent groups and terrorist 
organizations, as well as those between competing ethno-sectarian factions. This is not to 
mention the plights of so many ordinary Iraqis (such as the seven families sharing the apartment 
block in Karkh) who continue to endure the countless struggles and hardships of the post-
Saddam era. Furthermore, such violence continues to take its toll on the democratic process in 
Iraq which itself is ongoing. Despite the fact that Iraqis have participated in a series of relatively 
free and fair elections, seen parties and governments form and citizens elected to the ranks of 
Prime Minister and President, the nation is by no means a stable and robust democracy. The 
government, its ministries and institutions are still relatively weak and the basic infrastructure of 
Iraq remains well below minimum acceptable standards in much of the country. Compounding 
all of this is the fact that the US withdrew all of its forces at the end of 2011, leaving an 
uncertain future beyond occupation. 
This also raises another limitation of this research project, namely that studying Iraq – its 
history, its political culture and especially its current situation – is decidedly difficult to do from 
the other side of the world. The various issues, risks and costs associated with researching Iraq 
have meant that while this study includes many primary sources and up-to-date information 
based on contacts within Iraq, it also relies on existing secondary information. While it is 
important to acknowledge here that such a methodology brings with it certain limitations to the 
scope of the study and the inferences it can make, the author has made every attempt to cite 
reputable and established works and to cross-reference these against other materials where 
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available. It is also important to note that this book does not represent a comprehensive political 
history of Iraq, if indeed such a thing is possible. This book is a deliberately potted history, 
emphasizing those moments in Iraqi history when people engaged with democratic principles, 
ideas and practices. 
Finally, determining whether or not Iraq will become a robust and stable democracy is 
beyond the scope of this study. This book is about the ways in which Iraq and its 
democratization have been constructed according to certain discourses which have for so long 
underpinned Western understandings of the Middle East. In addition, this project is also about 
scrutinizing these discourses and closely examining the assumptions on which they are based by 
re-examining the long and rich political history of Iraq. In the interest of establishing a stable 
and democratic Iraq, this book concludes that the democratic history of Iraq might be used as a 
powerful political and discursive tool where the Iraqi people may come to feel a sense of 
ownership over democracy and take pride in endorsing it. This could go a long way towards 
mitigating the conflicts across the nation and in stabilizing and legitimating its democratic 
order. This book therefore argues that there is much scholarly work left to be done in order to 
broaden the narrative of democracy and move beyond the overly simplistic framework provided 
for us by the discourses of Western democracy and Oriental despotism. By asserting alternative 
histories and emphasizing their democratic potentials, a step is taken not only towards a more 
nuanced picture of Iraqi politics per se, but also towards salvaging the utopian promise of 
democracy from the intersecting discourses which have constructed it for us. 
	
